The Tehran-Washington Talks Dilemma and Possible Scenarios

Introduction

Following three decades of mutual verbal attacks and threats of violence, Tehran and Washington are reviving hope for diplomatic talks. This is not the first time that Tehran and Washington engaged in diplomacy since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, as the two resorted to talks during two international crises; the first was during the war on Afghanistan in 2001 (wherein the two countries admitted to limited negotiations within the scope of the so-called war on terror and battling Al Qaeda activities), and the second was concerning Iraqi security, where the two countries’ ambassadors met in Baghdad for talks which did not yield any results.

on the occasions when the United States and Iran have come to the negotiation table , it has been over a specific issue, normally an American demand. For example, their negotiations over Iraqi security came as a direct result of the Baker-Hamilton Report which stressed the important role played by Iraq’s neighbors in Iraqi security. the report called on Washington to pay attention to certain countries, namely Iran and Syria. Washington sent Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to a meeting between Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, and the European Union in July 2008, but no actual relationship was established between Burns and Jalili, or at least none was reported.

American-Iranian relations after the Islamic Revolution has been defined by their escalatory nature which results from both country’s perception of the other – a situation which has led to lack of trust and a widening gap between the two states. Consequently, even considering diplomacy as an option has alarming political and security externalities in both countries – so much so that the NIC report issued in November 2007 --which confirmed that Iran has halted its military nuclear activities-- did not succeed in changing the general political mood in Washington. This fear of dip­plomacy can be better illustrated if we remember two important factors: firstly, the prerequisites set by each party which prevented comprehensive talks (the American condition that Iran halt all of its uranium enrichment activities before negotiations can start, and the Iranian demand of a change of American comportment towards it and the return of all Iranian finances frozen by Washington.) Second, setting high expectations for elections and linking election results to talks has proven problematic, if results do not appeal to either party then talks are dismissed. This chronic fear of diplomacy was further intensified by the countries’ inability to achieve much through their limited talks and their mutual feeling that each party is being inflexible – all of which has led to frustration.

It should also be noted regarding previous American-Iranian talks is that they were bilateral or hosted by a third party which did not enjoy true political leverage to broker agreements, which leads us to consider the role that can be played by a third party in Iranian-American negotiations.

http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf

http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/16/us.iran/index.html, 16 July 2008.

http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf, November 2007